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THE PRICE OF BEAUTY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO AESTHETIC NUISANCE
George P. Smith II*
Griffin W. Fernandez**
One man's justice is another's injustice; one man's beauty,
another's ugliness; one man's wisdom, another's folly; as one
beholds the same objects from a higher point.1
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in
the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives
a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity,
where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought
to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to reg-
ulate those of others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity,
is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real
sweet or real bitter.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have characterized the history of nuisance as the
articulation and valuation of a "bundle of rights" pertaining to the
enjoyment of real property.3 The articulation and valuation of
particular rights in the context of land use conflicts often depends
upon the economic exigencies of society.4 Thus, when the eco-
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. LL.M. 1975, Columbia
University; J.D. 1964, B.S. 1961, Indiana University.
** J.D. 1990, The Catholic University of America; A.B. 1987, College of William
and Mary.
1. R.W. EMERSON, Circles, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
179, 187 (1979).
2. D. HUME, Of the Standard of Taste, in OF THE STANDARD OF TASTE AND OTHER
ESSAYS 3, 6 (J. Lenz ed. 1965).
3. See Grey, The Distintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 (1980);
Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2, 3 (1990).
4. See infra notes 19-72 and accompanying text.
One commentator has suggested that property is no longer "a central category of
legal and political thought;" no longer is it about "real-thing ownership" or "absolute and
exclusive" and "fixed and concrete." Grey, supra note 3, at 74, 82 (1980). Rather, scholars
today define property as a bundle of rights, with fragmentations producing profound cultural
and political consequences. See, e.g., Krier, The (Unlikely) Death of Property, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 75, 76, 79, 81 (1990).
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nomic conditions driving a legal perspective change, 5 the law must
adapt in order to better reflect societal values.
A conspicuous relationship exists between economic devel-
opment and American nuisance law.6 For example, nineteenth-
century courts involved in nuisance disputes between entrepre-
neurs and individual landowners employed a balancing test to
determine the propriety of granting injunctions against the indus-
trial defendants. 7 While contrary to traditional nuisance principles,
which mandated issuance of an injunction upon a finding of inter-
ference with a landowner's enjoyment of his or her property, this
novel method of decisionmaking favored entrepreneurs, thereby
promoting the country's economic development.8
Overall, nuisance law continues to exhibit sensitivity to the
economic realities and social context of modem American societyf
However, courts have not adapted nuisance law to contemporary
economic and social contexts. In particular, courts continue to
deny relief for injury to the aesthetic interests0 of residential
landowners.1
The bases upon which courts continue to withhold recognition
of aesthetic nuisance actions 2 lack both economic justification and
5. See infra notes 19-72 and accompanying text. See generally Kurtz, Nineteenth
Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Injunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 621 (1976).
6. See infra notes 19-72 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d
700 (1972) (en banc); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
§§ 5.3-.6 (1973).
10. In this Article, injury to "aesthetic interests" will be defined as injury suffered
due to the visual environment. No distinction will be made between "obstruction of view"
and "unreasonable appearance." But cf. Michelman, Toward a Practical Standard for
Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PaAc. LAW. 36, 37 (1969).
11. See generally Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional
Judicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 (1987); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging
Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1075 (1970) [hereinafter Note, Emerging Cause of
Action]; Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1939); Comment,
Injunction Against "Sight" Nuisance, 2 U. PrTr. L. REV. 191 (1936) [hereinafter Comment,
"Sight" Nuisance].
12. See sources cited infra note 73; see also Note, Emerging Cause of Action, supra
note 11. In refusing to recognize actions for aesthetic nuisance, courts have argued that
liability for unaesthetic conditions would substantially impede land development and, there-
fore, economic growth. Id. at 1075 n.4. However, this argument in favor of unhindered
economic development does not enjoy universal acceptance. See, e.g., Comment, Obstruc-
tion of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 94, 110 (1977) [hereinafter
Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight] ("The promotion of full development of land was
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legal coherence. The traditional distinction of visual versus aural 13
and olfactory 14 interferences with the enjoyment of property lacks
sufficient justification. Instead, courts should resolve conflicts em-
anating from unaesthetic uses of land through a balancing test
which incorporates the same "objective" standard courts use in
cases involving allegedly unreasonable sounds and smells, that is,
what the surrounding community considers reasonable. 15 This ob-
jective standard, combined with an analysis of the economic con-
sequences of the injury suffered and the relief sought, provides a
sound basis for the adjudication of aesthetic nuisance cases.
Use of a balancing test requires consideration of whether or
not the visual environment is in fact economically significant. Nuis-
ance law's disregard for aesthetics contradicts the serious value
zoning law attaches to the visual environment. 16 Moreover, while
the law of nuisance considers that visual phenomena cannot be
repugnant or pleasing to people in the same way that smells or
sounds can be, common sense, as well as the practice of the real
estate industry, shows that people value the visual appearance of
appropriate to a growing country with an expanding frontier. It is, however, an increasingly
questionable policy to pursue in America today."). See generally TASK FORCE ON LAND
USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN
GROWTH (1973); Hutchinson, Bringing Resource Conservation into the Mainstream of
American Thought, 9 NAT. RESOURCES J. 518 (1969); Reilly, New Directions in Federal
Land Use Legislation, 1973 URB. L. ANN. 29 (1973). Reilly describes the emergence of
new thinking regarding economic progress:
In recent years a new attitude toward urban growth has become evident in the
United States. This attitude does not accept traditional processes of relatively
unconstrained, piecemeal urbanization as entirely desirable or inevitable ....
The new mood appears to be part of a rising emphasis on human values, on
the preservation of natural and cultural characteristics that give distinctiveness,
charm and desirability to a place as a humanly satisfying environment.
Id. at 56.
13. See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
16. This Article will inquire into two areas of the law besides nuisance that deal
directly with aesthetics. Zoning will be discussed in order to show the social value of
aesthetics. Eminent domain cases involving the question ofjust compensation for aesthetic
takings will demonstrate judicial recognition of the value of aesthetics.
For a general consideration of aesthetic objectives, regulation and emerging patterns,
see P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.03-.06 (1989); R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 7.13-.25 (3d ed. 1986); F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS &
J. DELANCY, HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE § 9.3 (1985); A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §H 14.01-.04 (4th ed. 1984); E. YOKLEY, ZONING
LAW AND PRACTICE §H 4-3 to -5 (4th ed. 1980).
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their community.17 Finally, decisions awarding damages for purely
aesthetic injury resulting from the exercise of the eminent domain
power support consideration of the aesthetic environment by
courts construing nuisance law.18
This Article maintains that, contrary to the majority of legal
opinion, the right to enjoy property should include the right to be
free from aesthetic or visual nuisances. Part I will examine the
nineteenth-century transformation of nuisance law in response to
the United States' movement towards industrialization. This part
will discuss nuisance law's adaptability and flexibility, and will
highlight the development of a balancing test in nuisance decisions.
Finally, Part I will demonstrate that courts may utilize nuisance
law to adjudicate conflicts over the aesthetic environment. Part II
will consider use of an objective standard in aesthetic nuisance
disputes. This part criticizes the common judicial view that objec-
tive standards cannot determine disputes over the aesthetic envi-
ronment. Part II will also consider the standards used in aural and
olfactory nuisance disputes. Part III will discuss the problem of
aesthetic value. First, this part will show the practice of aesthetic
zoning as evidence of the social value of aesthetics. Second, Part
III examines modem real estate appraisal methods and will show
that economic terms can express aesthetic value. Finally, this part
will present evidence of judicial support for economic valuation of
aesthetics through examination of eminent domain cases awarding
just compensation for purely aesthetic injury. Part IV discusses
the practical application of the classical balancing test in disputes
involving the aesthetic environment.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF BALANCING IN NUISANCE LAW
An examination of the development of nuisance law reveals
a relationship between transformations within that body of law
and the transition of the American economy from agriculture to
17. Contemporary real estate appraisal methods support this common sense approach
by valuing aesthetic considerations incidental to the ownership of real property. See infra
notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 132-153 and accompanying text.
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industry.19 From the colonial period into the early part of the
nineteenth century, American nuisance law followed the traditional
English Common Law rule of property sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas, which translates as "use your own property so as not
to injure others. ' 20 This maxim made an actor strictly liable for
any of that actor's interference with another person's enjoyment
of his or her real property.21
From the middle to late 1800's, industry and manufacturing
quickly developed throughout the nation. In an implicit attempt to
protect the country's economic growth, 22 courts turned from the
sic utere principle. Instead, courts began following the traditional
tort concept of fault, 23 requiring that the nuisance-causing activity
be "unreasonable" before liability would result. In deciding
whether to grant injunctions, courts began to consider the "public
convenience" as a factor.24 This led to the emergence of an implicit
reasonableness standard.
In the 1842 case of Barnes v. Calhoun,25 an individual land-
owner sued the owner of adjacent property in order to enjoin the
construction of a mill on the latter's land. The plaintiff contended
that the mill construction would cause a pond on the defendant's
19. See Kurtz, supra note 5. See also Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance:
Common Law Citizen Suits For Relief From Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883
(1989).
20. Strictly applied, the rule requires the abatement of any activity sufficient to be
termed a nuisance. See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 623.
21. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Some regard the maxim to be mere
verbiage-this is because the application of various balancing tests often leaves the plaintiff
to bear a loss as damnum absque injuria. Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property
as a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 383, 386-90 (1917);
Manson, A Reexamination of Nuisance Law, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 185, 188 (1985).
See also Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and The Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA
L. REv. 775 n.1 (1986).
However, the sic utere maxim shapes the perimeters of the fundamental inquiry into
whether a particular set of facts qualify as a nuisance. As one commentator states, the
maxim tests when a defendant's conduct is unreasonable or invasive of a plaintiff's rights,
"not when it fails a social cost benefit test." Thus, the balancing test emphasizes analysis
of behavior-both reasonable and unreasonable-and not on pursuit of "a particular out-
come pattern." White, Economics and Nuisance Law: Comment on Manson, 8 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 213, 214 (1985).
22. See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 622-23.
23. See, e.g., Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1888); Harrison v.
Brooks, 20 Ga. 537 (1856); Lexington & Oh. R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1839);
Brown v. Carolina Cent. Ry. Co., 83 N.C. 128 (1880); Bradsher v. Lea, 38 N.C. (3 Ired.
Eq.) 301 (1844); Barnes v. Calhoun, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 199 (1842); Richard's Appeal, 57
Pa. 105 (1868).
24. See sources cited supra note 23.
25. 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 199 (1842).
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land to overflow onto the plaintiff's land, rendering it unfit for
cultivation. The defendant admitted that such overflow would oc-
cur, but took issue with the extent of the damage that would result.
In addition, the defendant asked the court to consider the degree
to which the mill would serve the "wants of the community. '26
Apparently sympathetic to community interests, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina denied equitable relief for the plaintiff.
The court held that when considering whether to grant a nuisance
injunction, a court should "be particularly cautious thus to inter-
fere, where the apprehended mischief is to follow from such es-
tablishments and erections, as have a tendency to promote the
public convenience." 27
The 1844 case of Bradsher v. Lea28 involved another nuisance
suit over the erection of a mill. In this case, neither the mill pond
nor the creek feeding it threatened to overflow onto the plaintiff's
land. Nevertheless, the plaintiff claimed that the pond presented
a health hazard to him and his family. In denying the injunction,
the court wrote:
[W]hen the use [the defendants] make of [their land] is to the
public convenience, and the injurious effect confined to a pri-
vate individual, the interest of the latter must give way to that
of the many, unless he can make it manifestly appear, that so
great a difference exists between his injury and the public
convenience, as bears no comparison, and that the erection
will be followed by irreparable mischief, in which case the court
will interfere by injunction. 29
Bradsher and Barnes show the emergence of an implicit reason-
ableness standard amounting to a rough balancing test based on
public policy considerations.
In the 1839 case of Lexington & Ohio Railroad v. Applegate,30
the court not only referred to the public convenience of the offen-
sive activity, but also took into account the economic changes
throughout the nation. In Lexington, a group of forty-three home
and shop owners sought to enjoin the operation of a new railroad
that ran adjacent to their properties, and caused the owners "some
26. Id. at 199.
27. Id. at 201.
28. 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 301 (18W).
29. Id. at 305.
30. 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1839); see Kurtz, supra note 5, at 645-46.
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inconvenience, and even loss."' 31 The court may have been im-
pressed by the fact that the railroad carried 550 passengers per
day at a low cost. But beyond the public convenience of efficient
transportation, the court indicated that a new standard of nuisance
would have to evolve in order to keep pace with industrialization. 32
It thus denied the request for an injunction:
[T]he onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent,
have its way. The law is made for the times, and will be made
or modified by them .... [R]ailroads and locomotive steam
cars... should not, in themselves, be considered as nuisances,
although in ages that are gone they might have been so held
33
Lexington, as well as Bradsher and Barnes, supports the prop-
osition that in mid-nineteenth-century nuisance suits "the entre-
preneur could depend on unarticulated favorable treatment [be-
cause]... [m]ost courts, believing that industrialization was either
a positive social good or an inevitable force, would consider the
defendant's status as an entrepreneur. ' '34 While already exhibiting
flexibility in the face of social and economic transitions, these
crude balancing techniques only foreshadowed more refined tests
that emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 35
From roughly 1860 to 1900, the American economy experi-
enced the largest growth in its history.3 6 By the turn of the century,
the United States had become the most economically powerful
nation in the world.37 During this period, courts considering in-
junctive relief in nuisance actions began to develop more sophis-
ticated balancing tests that focused less on the convenience of the
public and more on the relative hardships that the parties would
suffer if the remedy were granted or denied.
31. 38 Ky. (8 Dana) at 301.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Kurtz, supra note 5, at 649.
35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 38.
36. See R.L. HEILBRONER & A. SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA: 1600 TO THE PRESENT (1984); H.U. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
(1960); A.J.Y. BROWN, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: 1860-1940 (1951); E. KIRKLAND, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE (1947).
37. See E. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE: BUSINESS, LABOR AND PUBLIC
POLICY 1860-1897 (1961).
1991]
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The first case to explicitly balance the hardships of the parties
to a nuisance dispute was Richard's Appeal, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in 1868.38 The plaintiff, a homeowner,
claimed to suffer a great amount of air and noise pollution at the
hands of a neighboring iron works. Without authority to support
its reasoning, 39 the court introduced an analysis which would "con-
sider whether [an injunction] would not do a greater injury ...
than [that which] would result from refusing [it]. ' ' 40 The relevant
factors in the case included a capital investment of $500,000 in the
factory and its employment of over 800 men. Because of the great
economic hardship that a factory closing would inflict on the de-
fendant and the community, the court found the homeowner's
injury insufficient under this new standard to sustain an
injunction. 4'
The doctrinal innovations of Richard's Appeal enjoyed wide
acceptance in other jurisdictions. 42 The Alabama Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning of Richard's Appeal in Clifton Iron Co. v.
Dye.43 Clifton involved a mining operation in which the process of
washing ores not only caused a stream on the plaintiff's land to
be polluted, but also caused the stream to overflow and deposit
sediment on the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff used the stream
primarily for watering and bathing livestock. The court found the
fact that the plaintiff had another source of water on his property
to cast doubt on the amount of "material injury" actually suf-
fered. 44 The court also laid out a simple test to decide whether or
not to grant an injunction in nuisance cases: "[The] court should
weigh the injury that may accrue to the one or the other party,
and also to the public, by granting or refusing the injunction. '45
Employing this analysis, the court concluded that when weighed
38. 57 Pa. 105 (1868).
39. Id. at 113.
40. Id.
41. Although not explicitly stating so, the court may also have considered the con-
sequence of employment in its decision. One commentator has argued that the "economic
analysis" of the Richard's Appeal court not only redefined the character of nineteenth-
century nuisance law, but also "represented the thinking of courts into the twentieth
century." See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 658.
42. See, e.g., Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1888); Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904); Galveston, H.
& S.A. Ry. v. De Groff, 102 Tex. 433, 118 S.W. 134 (1909).
43. 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1888).
44. Id. at 470, 6 So. at 193.
45. Id. at 471, 6 So. at 193.
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against the injury suffered by the plaintiff, "the great public inter-
ests and benefits" flowing from the mining operation required de-
nial of the injunction.46
The Texas Supreme Court in Galveston, Houston & San An-
tonio Railway Co. v. DeGrofft7 also employed an explicit balancing
test. This case concerned a hotel that was located approximately
120 feet from a street used by the defendant railroad. The railroad
used a particular portion of the tracks adjacent to the hotel as a
switching station for railroad cars. The high concentration and
constant manipulation of the locomotives at the station subjected
the hotel to heavy vibration and extremely loud noises. Often,
such disturbances occurred between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m., making it
difficult for the owner and his guests to sleep. Despite the injury
to the plaintiff and his business, the court denied the injunction.
The court set forth the following balancing test:
The question of issuing an injunction, under such state of facts,
depends upon the circumstances, and it is the duty of the court
to consider the relative injury to the plaintiffs by a continuance
of the nuisance to that which would be inflicted upon the de-
fendant and the public by granting and enforcing an injunction,
and, if the injury to the plaintiffs appears to be greatly less in
amount in comparison to that which will result to the railroad
company and the public, then it is the duty of the court to deny
the writ of injunction. 48
By adopting balancing tests essentially identical to the one in
Richard's Appeal, cases like Galveston and Clifton were able to
reach fair and efficient outcomes which preserved the ability of
industrial defendants to operate despite the inevitable land use
conflicts to be expected in a time of metamorphosis in the Amer-
ican economy.
Notwithstanding wide acceptance of the balancing test that
originated in Richard's Appeal,49 some courts did not accept this
test. Ironically, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which had
decided Richard's Appeal twenty-six years earlier, explicitly over-
turned that case in Evans v. Reading Chemical & Fertilizing Co. 50
46. Id.
47. 102 Tex. 433, 118 S.W. 134 (1909).
48. Id. at 442, 118 S.W. at 138.
49. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 42.
50. 160 Pa. 209, 28 A. 702 (1894).
1991]
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In the process of retreating from its ground-breaking holding, the
court wrote: "[Richard's Appeal] can [not] be authority for the
proposition that equity, a case for its cognizance otherwise being
made out, will refuse to protect a man in the possession and
enjoyment of his property because that right is less valuable to
him than the power to destroy it may be to his neighbor or the
public. ' 51 Pennsylvania ultimately returned to the principles of
Richard's Appeal in the 1918 case of Becker v. Lebanon & Myers-
town Railway.5 2 However, its holding in Evans signaled some
judges' discomfort in departing from the tradtional Blackstonian
idea that once a nuisance is found, the plaintiff has a right to an
injunction.
The reasoning in Evans also characterized the law in New
York until well into the twentieth century.53 An examination of the
decisions in New York near the turn of the century shows that a
variation of the balancing found in Richard's Appeal was being
used, but this analysis fell short of accomodating the industrial
context in which it was employed. In McCarty v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co.,5 4 the defendant's manufacturing plant produced smoke
which often completely enveloped the plaintiff's house. In up-
holding an injunction, the Court of Appeals of New York did not
resort to a balancing test. Rather, the court merely noted that the
determination of whether a nuisance existed depended on the rea-
sonableness of the use in question "under the circumstances."55
McCarty and Richard's Appeal differ in that the Richard's
Appeal balance occurred at the remedial stage, while McCarty
used a balancing test to decide whether a nuisance existed at all.
The approach taken by the McCarty court created two important
problems. First, it was difficult for the courts to show flexibility
in industrial disputes where the injury to the plaintiff was clearly
substantial. In other words, if the damage to the plaintiff was
severe, the court would have little choice but to find an enjoinable
nuisance regardless of the amount of capital invested in the defen-
51. Id. at 223, 28 A. at 709.
52. 188 Pa. 484, 41 A. 612 (1898).
53. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913);
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
54. 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907); see Kurtz, supra note 5, at 661-65.
55. 189 N.Y. at 40, 81 N.E. at 549.
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dant's operation or the impact that an injunction would have on
the economy of a community. Second, if the court did in fact
determine that, despite injury to the plaintiff, a nuisance did not
exist, then the injured party was unable even to recover damages
from the defendant.5 6
The "balance of utilities" test formally adopted by the Amer-
ican Law Institute in section 826 of the first Restatement of Torts
demonstrated the same inflexibility as the New York approach.5 7
The Restatement provided that "an intentional invasion of anoth-
er's interest in the enjoyment of land is unreasonable ... unless
the utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of the
harm. ' 58 Again, while this approach evaded the problem of bal-
ancing land use rights at the remedial stage and, therefore, left
intact the right to an injunction when a substantial invasion of
rights existed, it still produced inequities. One commentator
stated: "The primary deficiency in the Restatement's balance of
utilities doctrine was that it rendered any activity with sufficient
social value absolutely immune from liability for interference with
the use and enjoyment of nearby land. '59
Although the majority of courts in the twentieth century em-
ployed the sharply contrasting remedial balancing of "conve-
56. See, e.g., Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 58 S.W. 999
(1900).
57. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 (1939).
58. Id.
59. Lewin, supra note 21, at 780-81. Synthesizing the work of Coase, Calabresi and
Melamed, Ellickson, and Rabin, Lewin delineates his understanding of what emerges
primarily as an Ellickson-Rabin "modem" scheme of nuisance. This scheme: (1) separates
the assignment of entitlements from the choice of remedies; (2) assigns entitlements pri-
marily on the basis of fairness, imposing liability under standards of "unneighborly" conduct
or for "moral fault"; (3) creates a general presumption that prevailing plaintiffs are to be
denied unconditional injunctive relief; and (4) permits a plaintiff to obtain a compensated
injunctive remedy in which the court will grant injunctive relief only if the plaintiff pays
the defendant an amount of money determined by the court. Id. at 802-03. Lewin then
suggests a reformulation of the modem scheme. Whenever efficiency is important, Lewin
would require that courts apply a "public interest" test prior to enjoining a nuisance. He
further urges that courts evaluate questions of entitlement and remedy separately. Id. at
827-32.
See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Caiabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of The Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Rabin, Nuisance
Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977); see also Polinsky,
Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies,
32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
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nience" test, 60 it was not until the 1970's that both the New York
Court of Appeals and the American Law Institute ("A.L.I.") aban-
doned the balancing of utilities test. 61 With the adoption of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts62 in 1977, the A.L.I. incorporated
the essentials of the most popular types of balancing tests. The
Restatement (Second) thereby increased courts' flexibility in both
the determination of and the remedy for a nuisance. 6 The test has
been summarized as follows:
[A]n intentional nontrespassory invasion will result in nuisance
liability (1) if the harm resulting from the invasion is severe
and greater than the plaintiff should be required to bear without
compensation; (2) if the gravity of the harm outweighs the
utility of the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff will be entitled
to either an injunction or damages; (3) if the gravity of the harm
does not outweigh the utility of the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff will not be entitled to an injunction, but only to dam-
ages, and he will not even be entitled to damages if the financial
burden to the defendant of compensating the plaintiff and others
similarly situated would have the same effect as an injunction 4
60. See, e.g., Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Riter
v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); York v. Stallings, 217
Or. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959); Faragason v. Economy Furniture, Inc., 356 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1962).
61. See infra notes 63-64.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826(a), 826(b), 829A (1977).
63. Lewin, supra note 21, at 784.
The first balancing test weighs the interests of the individuals to determine whether
a nuisance exists. The second balancing test determines the appropriateness of the remedy.
Only in the second test are courts to apply economic considerations to the property rights
being challenged. See Manson, supra note 21, at 189-91.
It has been argued, however, that in a fast-paced society where "technology and
social patterns are rapidly changing," a foreseeability test is the more appropriate means
to adjudicate nuisance claims. Under this approach, the trier of fact determines whether
the parties would reasonably expect the alleged nuisance to impose liability. Id. at 198-
202.
Under the foreseeability test, no effort is made to determine initial sets of property
rights. Indeed, this test "acknowledges that current rights are well-defined, but asserts that
the duration of those well-defined rights extends only to the foreseeable future." Id. at 198-
99. To use foreseeability as such a normative theory, however, is to ignore the fundamental
principle of Anglo-American law that enshrines property as a right and recognizes land
tenure as perpetual. White, supra note 21, at 220. Accordingly, "[o]wnership and occupancy
rights in legitimately acquired land are uncompromised by arrival (or foreseeability of
arrival) of another person who wishes to own and occupy the land, even if that person can
use the land more profitably, and justly so." Id. at 220-21.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826(a), 829A, 826(b) (1977); see
Ellickson, supra note 59, at 738-48 (arguing that the balancing process creates not only
uncertainty, but also excessive administrative expense in nuisance litigation). See generally
McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C.L. REV. 585 (1988); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and
Risks in Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
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Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 65 likely influenced the A.L.I. in
its decision to adopt a test essentially the same as the balance of
convenience. In Boomer, the New York Court of Appeals finally
rejected the reasoning of McCarty and, in doing so, provided the
law of nuisance with perhaps its most important innovation of the
twentieth century. The defendant in Boomer was a large cement
factory which represented a $45 million investment and employed
over 300 people. The plaintiff sued to enjoin both the emission of
large quantities of particulate matter and heavy vibrations caused
by the plant. Although the court expressed its concern for the
effects of air pollution on the health and welfare of the community,
it nonetheless recognized that the "judicial establishment is neither
equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce
nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for
the elimination of air pollution. ' 66 Even though the court found a
nuisance, it rejected the state's long-standing rule that any nuis-
ance could be enjoined. However, to enable the plaintiff to avoid
repeated suits for continuous injury to his property, the court
fashioned an innovative rule. It allowed the plaintiff to recover
"permanent" damages, calculated as the reduction in the prop-
erty's market value. 67
New York's rejection of the balance of utilities doctrine and
its creation of the rule of permanent damages in Boomer illustrates
that almost one hundred years after the decision in Richard's
Appeal the common law of nuisance remained adaptable to the
economic realities of society and yet retained a fair method of
compensating those who suffered inconvenience and injury at the
hands of industrial defendants. Boomer was not, however, the only
example of the flexibility and adaptability of nuisance law in the
latter part of the twentieth century.68
65. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
66. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
67. Id. at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
68. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
Traditionally, nuisance disputes have three possible outcomes. The court might find
that no nuisance exists. If the court does find a nuisance to exist, it may grant either
damages or an injunction. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 59, at 1115-16. A fourth
possible outcome is the compensated injunction, whereby a prevailing plaintiff would obtain
an injunction only by paying the defendant "damages" for the destruction of the defendant's
entitlement. Id. Presently, a deserving plaintiff may only receive injunctive relief if the
damages he seeks exceed the costs of abatement for the defendant. Lewin, supra note 21,
at 806.
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The Arizona decision of Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development Co. 69 provided further innovation in nuisance law.
In Spur, a developer created a residential neighborhood adjacent
to a cattle feedlot and then sought to enjoin the operation because
it produced noxious odors. The Supreme Court of Arizona first
noted that if the developer were "the only party injured, [the court]
would feel justified in holding that the doctrine of 'coming to the
nuisance' would have been a bar to the relief asked by [the plain-
tiff]. '"70 However, the court held that "a proper and legitimate
regard of the courts for the rights and interests of the public"
required relocation of the operation. 71 Although the court re-
spected the rights of the homeowners, it nonetheless compensated
the innocent feedlot operators by requiring the developer to in-
demnify the business for the costs of shut-down and relocation. 72
Spur once again demonstrates the flexibility of the balancing ap-
proach to nuisance law. More notably, in this instance the balanc-
ing test favored the residential landowners.
Part I has shown that the efficient and fair solutions charac-
teristic of modern nuisance cases result from a highly flexible and
adaptable balancing doctrine that has steadily evolved since the
early nineteenth century. Part II will focus on the specific problems
associated with aesthetic nuisances. Part III will address the prob-
lem of social, economic and legal value of aesthetics. Part IV will,
however, return to the role of balancing and its importance for the
practical application of aesthetic nuisance standards.
III. AESTHETIC NUISANCE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Throughout the evolution of nuisance law, courts have almost
unanimously refused to recognize actions for aesthetic nuisance. 73
69. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
70. Id. at 185, 494 P.2d at 707.
71. Id. at 186, 494 P.2d at 708. Spur is the only reported decision in which a court
granted a compensated injunction in civil litigation. The court did not explain the basis for
its holding and seems to have found this remedy inadvertently. Interestingly, none of the
residents of Del Webb's Sun City development were parties to the lawsuit to enjoin Spur's
activities, although many of them filed separate claims for damages. Lewin, supra note 21,
at 792 n.73, 793.
72. Lewin, supra note 21, at 791.
73. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Arthur, 51 Ariz. 101, 74 P.2d
582 (1937); Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 A. 516 (1906); Perry Mount Park Cemetery
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Many judges are reluctant to entertain these actions because they
cannot define a standard sufficiently objective to adjudicate dis-
putes consistently.74 Yet a number of courts have recognized the
right of a landowner to be free from unaesthetic conditions. 75
Courts recognizing the legitimacy of an aesthetic injury have had
little difficulty in defining appropriate standards upon which to
base their decisions.76 In fact, these courts apply standards very
similar to well-established standards for aural77 and olfactory78
nuisances. The unique character of aesthetic phenomena, how-
ever, requires that courts refine such standards to ensure complete
objectivity.
The problem of aesthetic nuisance often arises in the context
of residential landowners adjacent to or near another property
owner who uses his or her property to store "junk. ' 79 The Missouri
case of Ness v. Albert" illustrates the prevailing judicial attitude
toward aesthetic nuisances. Ness justified its holding that the stor-
age of rusted appliances and a partially burned mobile home
(among other things) was not a nuisance by noting that unsightli-
Ass'n v. Netzel, 274 Mich. 97, 264 N.W. 303 (1936); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley,
458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Parkersburg
Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937) (Kenna, J., concur-
ring). See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 43 (1971); Coletta, supra note 11; Note,
Emerging Cause of Action, supra note 11; Noel, Unaesthetic Sights, supra note 11;
Comment, "Sight" Nuisance, supra note 11.
74. See, e.g., Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191
S.E. 368 (1937) (Kenna, J., concurring).
Courts could eliminate the problem of aesthetic injury by identifying nuisance as a
physical invasion of neighboring property. Of course, physical invasion alone would not
necessarily constitute a nuisance. Plaintiffs would have to show additional elements of
harmfulness, inappropriateness or undesirability. Norton, Takings Analysis of Regulations,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 84, 88 (1990). Alternatively, analyzing nuisance as a negative
externality would also pose problems. For example, if a supporter of the professional
football team, the Broncos, lived across the street from one or more houses painted "Bronco
orange" to celebrate the Bronco football team's Super Bowl berth, that individual property
owner could consider the painted homes to be an aesthetic injury to his property. But his
loyalty and commitment to "Bronco-mania" would prevent his seeking an injunction. Id.
75. Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Robie v. Lillis, 112 N.H.
492, 299 A.2d 155 (1972); Hay v. Stevens, 271 Or. 16, 530 P.2d 37 (1975); Foley v. Harris,
223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186 (1982); Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835
(1956); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
76. See sources cited supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, §§ 5.1-.3 (1977).
78. Id.
79. Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Foley v. Harris, 223 Va. 20,
286 S.E.2d 186 (1982); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191
S.E. 368 (1937).
80. 665 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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ness alone could not constitute a nuisance."1 To support its deci-
sion, the court reasoned:
Aesthetic considerations are fraught with subjectivity. Onb
man's pleasure may be another man's perturbation, and vice-
versa. What is aesthetically pleasing to one may totally dis-
please another--"beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Judicial
forage into such a nebulous area would be chaotic. Any ima-
ginary good from doing so is far outweighed by the lurking
danger of unduly circumscribing inherent rights of ownership
of property and grossly intimidating their lawful exercise. This
court has no inclination to knowingly infuse the law with such
rampant uncertainty.82
The equation of aesthetics and "beauty" which is found in the
opinion, and which is characteristic of other opinions rejecting
aesthetic nuisance actions, has been criticized as an "imprisonment
of the courts in their own linguistic web. 8 3 Rather than formulating
the problem at hand as one of interpreting objective aesthetic
standards, judges have erroneously seen their task as enforcing
their own sense of the beautiful and the ugly.84 This misunderstand-
ing, rather than the nature of the aesthetic, 5 prompts judges to
81. Id. at 1-2.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Coletta, supra note 11, at 153.
84. See, e.g., Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
85. Professor Coletta argues for consideration of the nature of aesthetics as "sym-
biotic interaction." In rejecting "aesthetic formalism," Coletta argues that "it is the observ-
er's intellectual, psychological, and cultural histories which create the symbolic meanings
the observer imparts to the sensory data." Coletta, supra note 11, at 154 (citing Costonis,
Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV.
355 (1982)). This perspective sees aesthetics as a "function of the cultural identity of the
neighborhood." Coletta, supra note 11, at 153. What is aesthetically acceptable in a partic-
ular circumstance can be ascertained by examining the norms of the community in which
the aesthetic phenomenon occurs. Professor Colletta concludes, as does this Article, that
the standard for aesthetic nuisance should be the same as that used in olfactory and aural
nuisance cases: whether the unaesthetic use of land would be regarded as substantial and
unreasonable by the average, ordinary citizen of the community. Id. at 160-62. The problem
which this Article ultimately addresses is how judges can measure practically the standards
of a community to decide an aesthetic nuisance case. One scholar argues that if aesthetics
are, for example, of greater importance to more members of a common unit development
than other issues of more practical significance, strict control standards may be imposed
on set-backs and exterior designs of the units while accepting a relaxed tolerance on music
and noise from the units: "It hardly matters that the aesthetics ordinarily lie outside the
law of nuisance while noise is the paradigmatic Wrong. What the parties think, not what
the law holds, is decisive. Any harm that the parties perceive should be taken into account,
just like any benefit." Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 713, 741-42 (1987) (emphasis added).
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shun aesthetic nuisance actions. To reject the right to be free from
a purely aesthetic but injurious use of land on the assumption that
a judge must decide an aesthetic nuisance case solely on the basis
of her own aesthetic sensibilities is clearly flawed reasoning. A
proper characterization of the judicial role in aesthetic nuisance
disputes can eliminate the problem of subjectivity in the decision-
making process.
It has been observed that "the rights of property should not
be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether
[property rights] should be permitted to plague the dominant hu-
man sensibilities, may well be pondered. '86 An appropriate under-
standing of the role of the judge in an aesthetic nuisance action
reveals that an adjudicatory method which appeals to the "domi-
nant human sensibilities," not to an "ultra-aesthetic taste," is pos-
sible. The search for such a method should begin with the case
law supporting the aesthetic nuisance action.
Among the cases most often cited to support the doctrine of
aesthetic nuisance is the 1937 West Virginia decision of Parkers-
burg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack.8 7 In Barrack, residential
landowners sought to enjoin the defendant from using his land to
store wrecked automobiles. The lower court ruled this unsightly
use of land a nuisance, and consequently granted an injunction. 88
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, on the
ground that the area had not been clearly established as exclusively
residential. s9 Despite its holding, the court's language offered
strong support for the viability of claims based on aesthetic nuis-
ance.90 Writing for the majority, Judge Maxwell declared that
unaesthetic uses of land "may seriously affect the residents of a
community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes, and may
produce a decided reduction in property values. Courts must not
be indifferent to the truth that within essential limitations aesthet-
ics has a proper place in the community affairs of modem
society."91
86. Noel, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148,
159, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (1923)).
87. 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937).
88. Id. at 608, 191 S.E. at 368.
89. Id. at 613, 191 S.E. at 371.
90. Id. at 612-13, 191 S.E. at 370-71.
91. Id.
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals next addressed
the issue of aesthetic nuisance in Martin v. Williams.92 The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the operation of a used car lot in a residential
neighborhood. The lower court granted an injunction, and the
higher court affirmed. The appellate court rested its decision pri-
marily on the finding that the bright lights and noise arising from
the business constituted a nuisance, but reiterated the view of the
Barrack majority. According to the court, in considering claims
for aesthetic injury judges "should not be aroused to action merely
on the basis of the fastidiousness of taste of complainants ....
[but] should act only where there is presented a situation which is
offensive to the view of average persons of the community." 93
Together, Martin and Barrack stand for the proposition that
courts need not shy away from cases involving aesthetic injury
because they fear dictating standards of taste and beauty. Again,
the judge's role is not to decide what is beautiful or ugly, but only
to ascertain the relevant community standards through an exami-
nation of the evidence. The court first should establish the char-
acter of the community in question, and then proceed to consider
whether the land use in question is reasonable under the circum-
stances. As the Oregon court in Hay v. Stevens 94 concluded, judges
should "begin with the assumption that in the appropriate case
recovery will be permitted under the law of nuisance for an inter-
ference with visual aesthetic sensibilities. The difficulty, however,
is in determining whether the interference complained of is of such
gravity as to warrant relief. 95
Two recent cases found an aesthetic interference to be of
sufficient gravity to warrant relief. Foley v. Harris96 and Allison v.
Smith97 have received much attention from other commentators. 98
Foley was a suit by residential property owners to enjoin the
defendant from using his lot to store wrecked automobiles. The
trial court granted an injunction because the automobiles were
92. 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956).
93. Id. at 595, 93 S.E.2d at 835.
94. 271 Or. 16, 530 P.2d 37 (1975).
95. Id. at 20, 530 P.2d at 39. Cf. E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 1-5 (4th
ed. 1980).
96. 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186 (1982).
97. 695 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
98. See, e.g., Coletta, supra note 11, at 149-51.
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unsightly and therefore constituted a nuisance. 99 In affirming the
trial court's decree, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
wrecked automobiles "definitely 'obstruct[ed] the reasonable and
comfortable use of the [neighbors'] property,"' and therefore the
defendant was properly enjoined. 100 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Al-
lison sued for damages and an injunction to prevent the defendant
from continuing to keep junk automobiles, scrap metal and rubbish
on his property. Finding for the plaintiffs, the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that "legitimate but unsightly activity such as the
accumulation of debris on land or the operation of a junkyard or
auto salvage business may become a private nuisance if it is un-
reasonably operated so as to be unduly offensive to its neighbors,
particularly when it is located in a residential district."'' 1
As these decisions illustrate, and as Justice Sutherland aptly
observed in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, "[a] nuisance may
be merely a right thing in a wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard."' 0 2 Certainly, the common law should
recognize that some unaesthetic uses of land are like "a pig in the
parlor" and should be treated appropriately. Recognizing the va-
lidity of actions for aesthetic nuisance logically extends the pro-
tection which nuisance law affords individuals from aural 0 3 and
olfactory""4 interferences with the use and enjoyment of land.
The allegation that aesthetic considerations are too subjective
to be the basis for judicial determination is undermined by the
historical recognition of both aural and olfactory nuisances. In-
deed, standards of aural and olfactory reasonableness seem ca-
pable of no greater objectification than standards of aesthetics.
Yet, courts have had no difficulty in enforcing what they deem to
be sufficient standards for determining the reasonableness of an
invasion.0 5 As judges deciding aural or olfactory nuisance cases
are not asked to be arbiters of taste, neither are judges who en-
tertain claims for aesthetic nuisance. As one judge in an aural
nuisance suit declared: "[While] I [cannot] say how many popular
99. Foley, 223 Va. at 28, 286 S.E.2d at 191.
100. Id.
101. Allison, 615 P.2d at 794, quoted in Coletta, supra note 11, at 150.
102. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
103. See, e.g., W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 5.1-.3 (1977).
104. Id.
105. Noel, supra note 11, at 5.
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songs may be sung in a private residence of an evening or how
much music or what kind may be produced there, or whether
those songs must be rendered in English or Yiddish ... I do not
mean to intimate that excessive noise ... could not be restrained
by the court. 10 6
General recognition of the action of aesthetic nuisance would
require judges to carry out analyses no more difficult than those
required in aural and olfactory nuisance cases. The controlling
issue would always be whether "normal persons living in the area
or community would regard the defendant's land use as a substan-
tial interference with their use and enjoyment of land .... The
objective standard is, therefore, provided by the 'objective, normal
individual.' "107 Mere philosophical clarification of the nature of the
aesthetic as a cultural and community-bound construct, however,
is not going to convince most judges to recognize aesthetic nuis-
ance actions. As Professor William Rodgers observes: "Judges
need some sort of community preference poll . . . to support a
judgment that the [aesthetic] injury complained of is 'substantial'
in a legal sense."' 08
Courts may have been reticent to decide aesthetic nuisance
cases precisely because of the difficulty of polling the community.
However, an empirically accurate and practical method to measure
the value of the aesthetic character of real property might make
courts more receptive to aesthetic nuisance actions. Aesthetic
zoning demonstrates the significant societal value of aesthetics. 10 9
More importantly, since modem real estate appraisal techniques
attach economic value to aesthetic considerations,1 0 community
preferences can be accurately measured by fluctuations in the free
market. Indeed, the law of eminent domain has long recognized
this empirical economic approach to aesthetic valuation in real
property law."'
106. Id. (quoting Miller v. Jersey Coast Resorts, 98 N.J. Eq. 289, 299, 130 A. 824,
828 (N.J. Ch. 1925)).
107. Coletta, supra note 11, at 161. See YOKLEY, supra note 95.
108. 1 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.5 (1986).
109. See generally D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 11.1-.13 (1982); Costonis,
Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV.
361 (1982).
110. See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 136-153 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE QUESTION OF AESTHETIC VALUE
A. The Police Power: Aesthetic Zoning
Societal endorsement of zoning ordinances supports judicial
consideration of aesthetic considerations in nuisance cases. Al-
though closely related to the state's power to zone, nuisance law
lags far behind zoning law's acceptance of aesthetic considerations
as a basis for decisions.
Historically, the police power's ability to regulate the visual
environment paralleled the common law's ability to deal with aes-
thetic interferences. 12 In the beginning of the twentieth century,
courts regularly struck down zoning ordinances that regulated only
aesthetic considerations. Bryan v. City of Chester113 illustrates this
point. In Bryan, the court considered the validity of a Chester city
ordinance which declared that billboards were nuisances per se,
and which prohibited future erection of such structures within the
city limits. The court unambiguously invalidated the ordinance:
This is a gross attempt at interference with the lawful use of
private property .... All statutory restrictions of the use of
property are imposed upon the theory that they are necessary
for the safety, health, or comfort of the public; but a limitation
without reason or necessity cannot be enforced.11 4
112. See sources cited supra note 109.
113. 212 Pa. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905).
114. Id. at 262, 61 A. at 896. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.16
(3d ed. 1986).
Today, through the use of zoning or sign ordinances, a significant number of state
municipalities control the siting of signs as well as billboards. N. ROBINSON, ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.01 (1988). In 1965, the Federal government
entered the field of sign regulation with the enactment of the Highway Beautification Act,
23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 139 (1965). Even with the 1978 amendments to the Act mandating
compensation for the removal of certain signs, the federal presence has not been a total
success. Id.
Regulating roadside aesthetics involves an essential legislative balancing of four
competing interests:
[Tihe interests of persons seeking preservation of the natural beauty of a
particular setting; the interests of a governmental body in maintaining roads
and highways free from unsafe and often unsightly obstructions in the form of
signs and billboards; the interests of the real estate owner in enjoying the
economic benefits of frontage on a road and, finally, the interests of those in
the advertising business to conduct a legitimate commercial enterprise.
Id. § 7.02.
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In 1926, the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty'1 5 dealt a severe blow to this perspective on zoning.
The ordinance at issue in Euclid divided the city of Euclid, Ohio
into districts classified by use, height of buildings and minimum
lot areas. Upholding the ordinance in question, the Court held that
"the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the
foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily
will furnish a fairly helpful [clue to the limit of the police power].
And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted ... in the
process of ascertaining the scope of the [police] power." '116 Since
this decision, the law of zoning has developed much further than
the common law of nuisance in the area of aesthetics. 117 Today,
contrary to what the Supreme Court indicated in Euclid, the com-
mon law of nuisance might take some instruction from zoning law.
Contemporary cases interpreting zoning ordinances have
given wide latitude to municipalities by broadly construing the
idea of the health and welfare of the community." 8 Some courts
have upheld ordinances regulating residential housing design for
the purpose of preventing depreciation in property values. In State
ex. rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, the Supreme Court of Missouri
upheld a city zoning ordinance which set architectural standards
for residential houses. 19 The language of the Berkeley opinion
makes clear the significance of the aesthetic:
If by the term "aesthetic considerations" is meant a regard
merely for outward appearances, for good taste in the matter
of the beauty of the neighborhood itself, we do not observe
115. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
116. Note, Emerging Cause of Action, supra note 11, at 1082 (quoting Euclid, 272
U.S. at 387-88).
117. See generally sources cited supra note 109.
118. State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Reid v. Archi-
tectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); State ex rel. Saveland
Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841
(1955).
119. State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W. 305, 306 (Mo. 1970). The ordinance
in Berkeley contained in its preamble a general statement requiring that buildings and
structures meet mininum architectural standards of appearance and similarity to surround-
ing structures, that "unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures" which harmed "the
stability of value and the welfare of surrounding property, structures and residents," as
well as "the general welfare and happiness of the community," be avoided, and that
"appropriate standards of beauty and conformity be fostered and encouraged."
Id. at 306-07.
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any substantial reason for saying that such a consideration is
not a matter of general welfare. The beauty of a fashionable
residence neighborhood in a city is for the comfort and happi-
ness of the residents, and it sustains in a general way the value
of property in the neighborhood. 120
This judicial recognition of broad regulation shows the social value
and legal relevance of the aesthetic aspects of real property. How-
ever, elected officials, not judges, draft the zoning provisions that
regulate aesthetics. If judges are to feel confident in their authority
to make decisions regarding interferences to aesthetic sensibilities,
they must have some method to gauge community values
accurately.
B. The Market as an Objective Indicator of Aesthetic Value
In Euclid, Justice Sutherland noted the close affinity between
nuisance law and the police power. 121 If the protection of property
values validates enactment of an aesthetic zoning provision, 122 then
by analogy nuisance law should recognize the aesthetic. In fact, if
an accurate method were formulated for measuring the effect on
the value of neighboring property caused by an obstruction of view
or an unsightly use of land,2 3 judicial non-recognition of the aes-
thetic nuisance action would be difficult to justify.
The real estate appraisal industry demonstrates the existence
of a reliable valuation method that judges and juries can consult
in the adjudication of aesthetic nuisance actions. In the field of
real estate appraisal, three generally accepted methods are used
120. Id. at 310 (quoting State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271,
284, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923)).
121. 272 U.S. at 387-88 (1926).
122. See supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
123. Michelman, supra note 10. Professor Michelman describes two different kinds
of aesthetic nuisances: "There is to begin with, the possibility of an assault on the aesthetic
sense, pure and simple-the sight of something that, in its own self-contained isolation, is
ugly, in bad taste, or poor in style, design, or form .... [A sight can also] be an aesthetic
nuisance because . . . it destroys or obstructs the view of a preexisting sight that was
beautiful in some purer sense (a building that blocks the view of a mountain)." Id. at 36-
37.
See also Annotation, Eminent Domain: Compensibility of Loss of View from Owner's
Property-State Cases, 25 A.L.R.4TH 671 (1983); Annotation, Unsightliness of Powerline
or Other Wire, or Related Structure, as Element of Damages in Easement Condemnation
Proceeding, 97 A.L.R.3D 587 (1980).
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to value a parcel of property: the "sales comparison approach,"
the "income approach," and the "cost approach.' 2 4 Because the
latter two approaches are usually reserved for commercial real
estate or rental property, this Article will consider only the sales
comparison approach.'2 5 This approach to valuation "is based on
the economic principle that a prudent purchaser will not pay more
for a property than the price of an equally desirable substitute
property would bring in the open market at that approximate point
in time. ' 126 By closely analyzing such factors as recent sales,
current listings and offers to purchase, appraisers can gauge mar-
ket attitudes relevant to the property being considered. 2 7 Most
importantly for purposes of this Article, however, the appraisal
expert can isolate one particular characteristic from a parcel of
property and value it separately from the overall appraisal of the
parcel. 28
When considering the aesthetic enjoyment characteristic of a
particular parcel of property, appraisers may consider the effects
on market value of both obstructions of view and noxious or
unaesthetic uses of land. 129 According to one expert: "[There is]
no lack of data for making adjustments based on aesthetic factors.
View and, proximity to a noxious use are just other variables in
the marketplace the measurement of which is no more subjective
than many other factors commonly valued."' 30 Moreover, valua-
tion methods remain the same regardless of the legal context in
which they are employed. 131 Therefore, an appraiser could value
view or unsightliness equally well in valuation of a taking by
eminent domain or an aesthetic nuisance.
124. H. ALBRITTON, CONTROVERSIES IN REAL PROPERTY VALUATION: A COMMEN-
TARY 51-78 (1982).
125. See Letter from Mark K. Tucker and Seth C. Miller, Real Estate Appraisers
for Arnold S. Tesh, Advisors of Washington, D.C. to Griffin W. Fernandez (Sept. 19, 1990)
(discussing the Direct Sales Comparison Approach) (on file with HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.).
126. H. ALBRITTON, supra note 124, at 51.
127. Id. at 52.
128. Interview with Arnold S. Tesh, Chairman of the Capitol Region Chapter of the
American Society of Real Estate Counselors, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 1990).
129, Id.; see also Cowley, The Value of View, APPRAISAL J., Apr. 1951, at 239-42;
Searles, Aesthetics in the Law, APPRAISAL DIG., Winter 1969, at 1-7; Edman, Damages to
Esthetic Values, APPRAISAL J., Jan. 1960, at 126-27; Sussna, Is the View Worth It?,
APPRAISAL DIG., Winter 1964, at 22-24.
130. Tesh interview, supra note 128.
131. Id.
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C. Eminent Domain: Just Compensation for Aesthetic Takings
Most discussions of eminent domain and aesthetics focus on
the law's general acceptance of aesthetics as a valid purpose for
a taking. 3 2 For example, in the leading case of Berman v. Parker,133
the Supreme Court held that the government could take land for
the purpose of making the community more beautiful. 134 While
Berman speaks to the appreciation of aesthetic value in other areas
of the law, it does not demonstrate how courts have utilized the
economic valuation of view and unsightliness. For this purpose, a
discussion of some of the many eminent domain cases holding that
the value of aesthetic factors must be included in the calculation
of just compensation for a taking. 135
The most recent and perhaps best support for allowing com-
pensation for aesthetic injury resulting from a taking can be found
in La Plata Electric Association v. Cummins.136 In La Plata, the
Supreme Court of Colorado considered whether owners of real
property "are entitled to compensation for the reduction in the
value of the remainder of property [taken] resulting from aesthetic
132. See Note, Emerging Cause of Action, supra note 11; Note, Aesthetics as a
Justification for the Exercise of the Police Power or Eminent Domain, 23 GEO. WASH. L.
REy. 730 (1955).
133. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
134. Id. at 35. Berman involved the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.
The Act sought the acquisition of real property which would then be leased or sold for
redevelopment. The appellants owned a department store which was in good condition and
did not qualify as slum housing under the Act. The purpose of obtaining the appellants'
property was to obtain "a better balanced, more attractive community." Id. at 31. Holding
that it was within the power of the legislature to condemn land in order to improve the
aesthetics of the community, Justice Douglas said:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... the values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled .... If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
that the Nation's Capitol should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Id. at 33.
135. See Annotation, Unsightliness of Powerline or Other Wire, or Related Structure,
as Element of Damages in Easement Condemnation Proceeding, 97 A.L.R.3D 587 (1980);
Annotation, Eminent Domain: Compensability of Loss of View from Oivner's Property-
State Cases, 25 A.L.R.4TH 671 (1983).
136. 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986).
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damage and loss of view."'1 37 The trial court had admitted evidence
showing the loss of aesthetic value and view and had allowed
compensation for these damages. 3 8 The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals upheld this ruling, and the Supreme Court of Colorado
affirmed.
The homeowners in La Plata owned a parcel of property
across which the La Plata Electric Association obtained a fifty-
foot-wide easement for the construction of powerlines.139 The ease-
ment cut across the plaintiff's nineteen-acre parcel, which com-
manded a view of the city of Durango and of the mountains beyond
it. At trial, the utility presented evidence that the best use of the
land was "investment property to be held for future development"
and that "there was no damage to the remainder of the property.' 1 40
On the other hand, despite agreeing with the utility's witness that
the best use of the property was for future investment, two expert
appraisers testifying for the homeowners found that the remainder
of the parcel suffered damage due to the unsightliness of the power
lines and the concomitant loss of view. 141 The aesthetic damage
was valued at $5,000.
Voicing the majority's support for the approach taken by the
district court, Colorado Supreme Court Justice Lohr held that "a
property owner should be compensated for all damages that are
the natural, necessary and reasonable result of [a] taking."'1 42 The
court's approval of the use of appraisers to decide the issue of
aesthetic damage indicates confidence in the opinion of those who
measure the market value of aesthetics through methods like the
comparative sales approach.143 Similarly, La Plata demonstrates a
workable standard for determining aesthetic nuisance based on
expert appraisal and traditional nuisance balancing.
Another eminent domain case, Kamo Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. Cushard,144 also allowed compensation for damages to
137. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 697.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
143. But see Allen, Wrong Numbers: Appraisers, Culprits in S&L Crisis, Are Now
Key to S&L Recovery, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 6. (explaining that in disposing
of the real assets of Texas savings institutions, the federal government's Resolution Trust
Corporation will place primary reliance upon the state's real estate appraisers' estimation
of the values of the various properties).
144. 416 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
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aesthetic sensibilities after the erection of electric powerlines on
a homeowner's land. In Cushard, the electric cooperative con-
demned a 100-foot-wide, 2800-foot-long strip of land across the
defendant's 220-acre farm for the construction of transmission
lines. Testimony was given by three real estate salespeople who
said that the unsightliness of the powerlines would diminish the
market value of the farm. 145 Holding that the trial court did not err
in refusing to give instructions that would have removed the aes-
thetic consideration as an element of damages, the Missouri Court
of Appeals said that a reasonable person would consider the lines
an eyesore and, therefore, the structures impaired the marketabil-
ity of the farm. 146
In Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Mire, a Louisiana court
found aesthetic factors relevant in a condemnation proceeding
involving powerlines. 147 In that case, the wires and poles being
constructed on the defendant's property were located entirely in
a section of swampland. The court noted that the swampland had
little value except that it was "a beautiful picturesque sight to look
at.' 1 48 While it held that aesthetic damage could not be an element
of compensation unless dimunition of market value could be
shown, the court found the testimony of real estate experts on
dimunition of value to satisfy that requirement.149
Finally, a New York court provided an excellent statement of
the position that aesthetic injury is compensable in the context of
eminent domain in Keinz v. State.150 The claimants in Keinz owned
property that fronted Irondequoit Bay in New York. When the
state took part of the land to build a highway, the landowners lost
not only their access to the bay, but also their view of the water,
which was completely blocked by the embankment upon which
the road was built.' 51 In holding that the landowners must be
compensated for their loss of view, the court said:
We believe that reductions in value due to impairment of view
must be considered .... Two properties might be physically
145. Id. at 649.
146. Id. at 655.
147. 140 So.2d 467 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
148. Id. at 475.
149. Id. at 477.
150. 2 A.D.2d 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
151. Id. at 415, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
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identical, yet their value markedly differrent because of the
surroundings . . . . The "view" might be a mountainside or a
valley as well as a lake. In either event, the view augments the
value of the premises, and if a portion thereof is taken and the
view is spoiled, the market value of the premises remaining is
reduced. The extent of the reduction is no more speculative
than many other factors affecting value. It may be a matter ofjudgment but it is also a matter of dollars and cents, and the
constitutional policy requires that such reduction in value not
be borne by the owner whose property is taken for a public
purpose without his consent.' 52
Review of these eminent domain cases indicates not only that
courts measure the value of the aesthetic environment of real
property with a degree of empirical accuracy, but also that courts
rely on these determinations to fix the amount ofjust compensation
in instances of aesthetic injury. 153 Coupling this economic valuation
of aesthetics with the modern tests for determining the existence
of, and proper remedy for, nuisances would create a clear, cogent
and practical method for deciding aesthetic nuisances.
V. AESTHETIC NUISANCE: PRACTICAL APPLICATION
This Article has shown that society places a great deal of
value on aesthetic interests, as reflected in the practice of aesthetic
zoning and its acceptance by the common law. Furthermore, re-
view of the law of eminent domain, as it pertains to just compen-
sation for aesthetic takings, indicates that the law has been, and
can be, confident in modern methods of aesthetic valuation. How-
ever, the law of eminent domain has limited applicability to the
problem of aesthetic nuisance because the law in the latter need
not be concerned with the interests of the state. The goal is to be
sure that the private citizen is given just compensation under the
law.
152. Id. at 417, 156 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
153. Some environmental regulations, especially in the area of land use controls,
may constitute a taking of private property for which private landowners must be compen-
sated by the government. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987). But see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See
also Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward A "Broader Vision" of Property Rights,
37 U. KAN. L. REv. 529 (1989).
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Nuisance law brings the more difficult task of balancing the
rights of individuals against each other in order to determine
whether a nuisance exists, and what kind of remedy should be
granted. A method to ascertain the economic value of aesthetic
considerations allows monetary values to be plugged into the mod-
ern balancing tests that pervade the law of nuisance.
Courts can apply aesthetic nuisance principles to land use
disputes in areas that are primarily residential but still not zoned
or zoned only minimally. Residential landowners in such fringe
areas deserve to have the character of the locality protected from
land uses that are patently unreasonable under community stan-
dards. For instance, a court could apply a balancing test to fairly
and efficiently resolve disputes involving a property owner who
keeps a junkyard in a residential area by applying a balancing test.
The court could consider several factors, including the character
of the locale, the utility of the junkyard, and the degree of harm
suffered by the plaintiff. The court could measure the utility of the
junkyard by the public convenience served by it and the amount
of income produced if it were operated as a business. The gravity
of the harm, however, might not only include the individual de-
preciation in property value suffered by the plaintiff, but an aggre-
gate depreciation of property values in the area due to the offensive
use. Valuation of aggregate depreciation would entail concerted
action on the part of the neighbors.
Upon determining that the plaintiff was and is suffering sub-
stantial harm, the court could fashion one of several remedies
available under contemporary nuisance standards. Assuming the
damage to land values was enough to constitute a nuisance, a
court could simply grant an injunction directing the defendant to
remove any junk from his property or to pay damages to the
plaintiff(s). 154
One may envision situations similar to the facts of Spur In-
dustries.155 For example, assume that a developer creates a neigh-
borhood in a scenic valley with a lake between two mountains.
The first residents who move into the area might decide that the
small-scale strip-mining operation on one mountainside is an an-
noyance, but consider the operation far enough away to be toler-
154. See Lewin, supra note 21.
155. For a discussion of Spur Industries, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
1991]
Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 15:53
able. Further assume that more and more people move into the
area and that a marina is established on the lake. This would attract
an even more affluent crowd, since water is scarce in this part of
the country and proximity to water is highly valued. The mining
operation is a constant subject of conversation as everyone in this
hypothetical would agree that it is an eyesore. Finally, the resi-
dents determine that if the valley could be rid of the aesthetic
irritant, property values would soar. The citizens then ban together
and sue to enjoin the operation.
Because the law does not recognize aesthetic nuisances, the
citizens would be without a remedy. However, if aesthetic injuries
were recognized, the court could provide a remedy such as the
one in Spur Industries. The mining business could be enjoined,
but the citizens of the valley, by now an affluent residential neigh-
borhood, would have to indemnify the company.
In addition to situations involving disputes between residential
and commercial land uses, aesthetic nuisance could resolve dis-
putes between neighboring residential landowners. For instance,
assume one homeowner in the valley referred to above decides to
build a fifty-foot observation tower next to his house so that he
and his wife can watch migratory birds landing in the lake. The
only problem is that the observation deck will obstruct the view
from his neighbor's bay window which overlooks the lake. The
neighbor sues to enjoin the building of the observation deck.
At trial, the neighbor produces four witnesses, all real estate
appraisers, who testify that his property value will drop $2,500 if
his view of the lake is obstructed by the tower. It is further shown
that the first homeowners can see most of the lake just as well
from their back patio as they will be able to from the new deck,
and that birds are visible on all parts of the lake surface. Despite
these facts, the neighbor has no remedy under current nuisance
law. If, however, the law recognized aesthetic injuries, the situa-
tion could be plugged into the Restatement (Second) balancing
test. In this situation the gravity of harm suffered by the plaintiff
($2,500) seems to clearly outweigh the utility of the conduct since
the people are already able to see most of the lake from their patio.
If the latter were not true, however, the homeowners would have
a more legitimate case and thus might be able to escape an injunc-
tion. Instead, the homeowners would need to pay damages to the
neighbor for the right to build the deck.
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The situations presented here are only a few of the possible
circumstances in which the right to be free from aesthetic nuis-
ances should exist. Rather than take the position that no real injury
can be caused by the aesthetic environment, the judiciary should
recognize the possibility of aesthetically unreasonable uses of land
causing legal injury and should then subject such claims to the
balancing test in order to determine if a remedy is warranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recognition of nuisance actions based on aesthetic consider-
ations would contribute to the efficient and equitable solution of
situations that are currently not remedied. Determination of aes-
thetic nuisance actions is not any more subjective than the current
task of courts in the context of aural and olfactory nuisance dis-
putes. The popularity of aesthetic zoning in many municipalities
demonstrates the societal value of aesthetics. Furthermore, judi-
cial recognition of the exercise of such police powers contradicts
the common law's reluctance to confront aesthetics in the realm
of nuisance. Finally, tools currently exist for the common law to
change its view of aesthetic nuisance. Modern real estate appraisal
methods make it possible to express community aesthetic prefer-
ences in monetary terms. In turn, such expressions allow for the
resolution of aesthetic disputes within the framework of modern
nuisance balancing tests. It only remains for courts to recognize
the new economic and social realities.
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